As Congress finally works to establish a more meaningful SEC whistleblower program, the SEC has just announced that it has charged Goldman Sachs and one of its vice presidents with fraud, in connection with a “financial product tied to subprime mortgages, as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter.”

Often maligned for failing to protect investors before the recent financial crisis, the SEC now charges that Goldman structured and marketed a “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” (CDO) like those that “contributed to the recent financial crisis by magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market,” and then violated the federal securities laws in connection with that product.

Post-Madoff, we have followed the legislative efforts to help establish an effective SEC whistleblower program. We know that the Senate Banking Committee in particular has worked hard in attempting to devise the best overall arrangement to encourage and reward whistleblowers who report fraud within the SEC’s jurisdiction.

Shortly before Congress authorized the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower Program in December 2006, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued its report on many of the changes needed for the IRS to use whistleblowers effectively.

Now, the SEC’s Inspector General David Kotz has issued his report, “Assessment of the SEC Bounty Program.” No one is surprised that it concludes that the SEC has not effectively encouraged, used, or rewarded whistleblowers over the past decades. Perhaps this report will pave the way for something meaningful–like the TIGTA report that preceded the now-promising IRS Whistleblower Program, which rewards whistleblowers with 15-30% of the government’s tax recoveries.

Could a meaningful SEC “whistleblower” program prevent the next Madoff or Stanford debacle? The SEC and legislators are now seriously considering that question. That Madoff managed to defraud investors for so long proves that the current system is inadequate.

Past experience proves that incentives to whistleblowers to report illegal acts work. The nation’s primary “anti-fraud” statute that protects federal funds, the False Claims Act, has been extremely successful in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward by allowing them to share in the government’s recovery.